Anglo-American Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, 1978-1985: Power, Influence and Restraint by Tore T. Petersen

Author:Tore T. Petersen [Petersen, Tore T.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Middle East, Political Science, World, History, General
ISBN: 9781845193713
Google: zEdm7Ie86bIC
Goodreads: 24693500
Publisher: Apollo Books
Published: 2013-06-28T00:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER

VIII

Saudi Foreign Policy: What Foreign Policy?

Saudi doom and gloom did not last too long in the aftermath of the Mecca incident. By May they were back to true form complaining and blaming the Americans. The Saudis were displeased with the American delivery schedule of military equipment, while Saudi forthcomingness on oil production and pricing was rewarded by the withholding of arms and snickering against the regime in the American press. West, who at this point, seemed to be infected by localities, warned “that without addressing the equipment issue to Saudi Arabia’s satisfaction, our already strained relationship will be further affected and we will not be able to induce the Saudis into a dialogue concerning wider security concerns and regional defense objectives.”1

While the Saudis felt they were too accommodating on the oil question, it was not enough for the Americans. The president wrote prince Fahd on May 30 1980 warning against further price increases of oil, to prevent inflation from escalating: “Saudi Arabia plays a vital role in determining whether we will be able to dampen inflation, adjust to a world less dependent on oil, and still maintain satisfactory economic growth. This is a grave responsibility. Under your leadership, Saudi Arabia has carried out that responsibility in a farsighted, consistent, and statesmanlike way.” The American counterpart to Saudi oil policies was Carter’s energy conservation programs, the president pointing out that American consumption of oil had declined beginning in 1979. The US encouraged its allies to adopt a similar conservation policy. But previous year’s increases in the price of oil threatened escalating inflation and “pose[d] a substantial threat to my personal effort to restore economic stability in the United States, while avoiding a deep recession – a difficult task at all times, but especially in an election year.” Rampant inflation could possibly threaten the necessary level of US defense spending to deter the Soviet menace. Therefore the president lauded the Saudi decision not to increase the price of oil, and urged them to keep prices and production steady for the remainder of the year. Implicit in the whole message was that the American guarantee of Saudi security hinged on cooperation on other areas of concern to the United States. In case Fahd had missed the point, Carter spelled it out to him at the end of the letter: “The health of the world economy and the common security are interests our two countries share to an extraordinary degree.”2

West followed up with a long memorandum on June 1, 1980, warning: “A major crisis is coming in U.S.–Saudi relations. Indeed, it has probably already begun, and is simply now increasing in intensity and severity.” The Saudis were displeased for getting little in return for their restraint on oil prices, and the American priority of Israel. The onesidedness of the American–Saudi relationship is typically demonstrated by the Saudis rattling the question of oil production to the hilt; there was little else they could threaten the Americans with. “Why do we continue to produce twice as much oil as we need to accommodate the U.

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